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REDESIGNING THE 2ND STAGE
LUNAR EXPLORATION/SETTLEMENT TEAM
Marylin h'.. Sheddan, Research Associate
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Unil'ersity
Daytona Beach. FL
Background
What will it take to not only get back on track with human exploration of space, but with its
settlement as well? Is this a goal which can be accomplished to any significant extent during our
own lifetimes? This paper makes specific recommendations about the possibility of such an
accomplishment , re-considers the conventional recommendations for an infrastructure to support
lunar exploration, and argues for several changes in the program as it is generally proposed
Even with the great new information coming in from the Clementine mission. we have scarcely
begun to develop a real program which will actually allow us to develop a permanently inhabited
facility. A whole collection of U.S. and Soviet unmanned explorers. mappers, and probes.
supplemented by the Apollo program, have provided us wi1h literal tons of information We have
an ever-growing collection of information about lunar geology (selenology), terrain, radiation
exposure and other environmental issues. We have concepts and, in some cases. plans, for habitats
on lunar orbit and on and within the Moon itself In various nations around the world. there exist
detailed studies of construction techniques adapted to 1/6G. factory concepts and plans, mining
recommendations for the collection of Helium 3 and endless amounts of speculation about
eve!)thing from the possibility of diamonds to evidence of former habitation on the moon Despite
a!l that, there are 110 funded programs for the return of human beings and the establishment of a
permanent facility on the Moon

Re- Thi nking the Program Stages
The Apollo program, those unmanned explorers, mappers, and probes provided a great deal of
preliminary information . On the assumption that everything which has come thus far is clearly
preliminary, Phase I of the actual permanent human presence on/in Luna can be expected to relate
closely to recommendations such as those in the Ride Report Some changes in those
recommendations. now eight years old, are made below Phase II will begin with the presence ofa
permanent, albeit extremely primitive. facility on Luna, staffed by a mix of perrrnrnent "loonies"
and temporary ' g round hogs" -- those who return to Terra Al that time. the sense of
permanence, of people no longer confined to the home planet will be inarguable Among other
things, this paper recommends telescoping Phase I so that we can mo\·e more quickly and
efficiently into Phase II To do that requires re-considering both the history and the !l1ture of the
plan for a permanent lu nar faci!ity.
In re-reading the mission information from the sixties, one cannot help but think that there were
actually two lunar programs all along The first one. de\·eloped b~· scientists. engineers and
academicians began •.vith the unmanned exploration of the moon and the preparatO!)' missions of
Gemini, thundered directly into Apollo's original 20-mission schedule. and \~as expected to segue
directly into longer and longer missions on and below the surface of the moon The second was
clearly driven by a separate political agenda'l Actually, there \\ere se\'eral the President's need for
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something big and attractive enough to overcome the Bay of Pigs fiasco; then there was the drive
to "beat them Russians" which pervaded the U.S. during the late 50s and beyond. When it became
easy to shut down the program, the politicians terminated the scientific missions and did so. Since
that time, any substantial return of human beings to space in any real quantity and for any truly
long-term missions has suffered from endless ennui. How to break that grip, and get back on track
-- immediately -- with or without a manned lunar program on the books?
Regaining t he I nertia
Ifwe are ever to reach Stage JI, it is imperative that we stop thinking (and planning missions) in a
strictly linear fashion. We must begin to think in terms of mission concurrency instead of
continuing the pretense that a permanent human presence in space is somehow isolated from
space activities which are more politically acceptable. The key is in using missions which are
funded, whatever they may be, to accoinplish the maximum number of tasks. One currently
developing unmanned mission provides an excellent example: Lunar Discovery Orbiter.
Assuming, of course, that the U.S. space program and the Lunar Discovery Orbiter program itself
survive the current American anti-intellectual and anti-technology blitz, the mission objective for
that program is to provide "the first high-resolution global survey" regarding lunar composition,
gravity and topography, and imagery". This program was developed as a part of the NASA
Discovery Program, each concept developed by some of the best minds in the world to make
available the most science "bang for the buck" That is politically and economically sound and, if
the technology is well done, scientifically effective as well But an effective return to the moon
can be developed far more quickly if we can just manage to provide program planners with a
sound rationale for using high-return, comparatively low-cost missions for secondary purposes. It
does not hurt any that the second goal of the program is to "Pursue innovative ways of doing
business". 1 So how can missions be re-arranged to do "double duty" and what can be
accomplished in that almost incidental fashion which will forward the Lunar program?
We in the aerospace industry have become tightly focused, our professional survival within the
extremely fragile space program so aependent on meeting only the mandates placed upon us that
any alternative is considered intrusive at best and, at worst, program threatening. Yet we can
move noticeably, significantly closer to Stage 2 aclivities and, in the process, shorten Stage I, if
we can only force ourselves to set aside tunnel vision during the earliest mission planning stages
Are there 35 or 40 cubic centimeters of space here and there in the Lunar Discovery orbiter -- or
can such small increments of space be put there by slightly altering its design? The STS may seem
an odd analogy, but its GAS-can program pro..,i des the seed of an excellent idea The GAS
program was developed as a way of carrying additional small experiments in the cargo bay of the
STS by supplying small containers in areas which would otherwise be wasted. In the instance of
the STS, those little bits of space are filled with experiments. But it need not be experiments
which are crammed into tiny corners of the Lunar mission hardware. Tools, sensors, and other
long-life devices could be attached to or stored in the hardware for any mission which is gain£ to
remain in lunar orbit for an extended period and/or remain on lhe moon. Sufficient mass/weight to
anchor them in position is negligible -- even a package of a few ounces will remain where it is
1"The Discovery Program Concept"; NASA WWW; downloaded January S, 1 995~ mosi recent upd.'lle logged as 20

Dec. 1994.
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dropped, ready to be picked up and utilized when we finally do send people back. And ifthe craft
is actually going to be left on the Lunar surface at the end of its mission, then so much the better
"Extra" items can be stocked in every possible square inch to the maximum extent possible
without jeopardizing the stability or mass of the hardware
This concept can be significantly enhanced if mission planning can be altered in one other
extremely significant fashion . If it is in any way possible, mission design should be reconsidered to
explore ways in which the hardware can, at the end of its other mission activities, be programmed
to "park" in a specific place. A related effort might be based on the fact that there are insufficient
experiments cleared in time for any given shuttle flight !O ensure that GAS cans are all filled It
may be time to reconsider the possibility of filling some of that space with payloads which can be
launched from shuttle and then boosted toward lunar orbit. On a somewhat grander scale, it may
now be the time to pull old studies off the shel( dust them off, and seriously re-consider the
Hitchhiker program, which was designed to permit the shuttle orbiter to carry small loads
intended for deep space. While the program was once deemed unfeasible for both technical and
economic reasons, technology has changed radically and the program may now be feasible
Regardless of the method by which small supply loads are launched, the time it will take them to
arrive and land remains irrelevant as long as we have no manned program anyway. The primary
design constraints would be the ability of the container to survive the trip to lunar orbit, sufficient
power to ensure that it can be boosted gently toward the Moon, and that it carry suflicient
telemetry to direct to and through Lunar orbit .
There is one more hardware option which mus/ also be considered, and that is the recent activity
in single-stage-to-orbit technology. If we are serious about a permanent facility on the moon, the
development of such launchers as the Delta Clipper, X-33 and/or the X-34 is imperative. None of
that should be deemed a reason to delay the early stages of a lunar program, however During the
development stages of American launch capability, it appears entirely feasible to
internationally available heavy lifters to begin boosting equipment toward the Lunar surface

Site Selection
Assuming that small payloads are actually sent to the lunar surface, where should all these items
be allowed to drop? Numerous studies have recommended specific sites for the development of
the first permanent Lunar facility. They have been analyzed for scientific potential, general
location, and curiosity value. With so many potential sites available, and so few already explored,
it may seem appropriate to commission another study. However, doing so will 1101 shorten Phase I
or advance the start of Phase II lunar exploration and settlement At this point, it seems
appropriate to simply say, "Just pick one site and do it!" Contrary to some mission planning
traditions, when it comes to the Moon almost any site is legitimate My personal preference is
Mare Fecunditatis, but it doesn't really matter. lfwe can convince ourselves to select one site and
start dropping off supplies there, then, when the day comes that we finally develop the collective
will to get off our backsides and take people back there, the site with supplies already stocked up
will make itself the logical base camp
Re-Thinking WHO Should Go
Off and on through the years, our space program policy makers ha\·e toyed with the idea of

....

allowing someone other than "traditional" astronauts into space. Of course, the concept of
"civilians in space" is a whole separate issue. In a way, it has been addressed -- to a limited extent
-- by the payload specialist program. However, rapid advancement to Phase II lunar exploration
aod settlement require much more attention to the idea of putting people on the moon who may
or may not have strong public relations value, but whose sole purpose in going is to advance the
development of the facility itself. Intellectually, many of us recognize that the time will come
when we need to take someone other than (or, more precisely, in addition to) the NASA
standard-issue astronaut on Luna. Though the analogy is somewhat simplistic, it is useful to think
again of the days when sailing vessels carried settlers to the "New World". Comfort and ease of
travel were not particularly relevant -- nor did the lack of those things prevent committed people
from setting out on the journey
Intellectually, we know that we must carry technicians, construction workers, and field engineers
to the Lunar surface, but when the time comes for mission planning, that phase always seems to
be "out there somewhere" -- after scientists have returned and finished their explora!ion, gathered
more samples, photographed th~ dark side, measured the radiation hazard, planted seismometers,
and the government has announced its blessing for the presence of "civilians". Moving as quickly
as possible ioto Phase II requires that we face, directly and without flinching, the need to expand
the types of people we will take into space
The New Crew -- Recommendations for Lunar Exploration/Settlement Teams
Dr. Ride's report recommended an outpost of eight people, slowly growing to as many as fifty
through a number of years. Stafford et al recommended a startup return group of six to 12 people
with 45 days of life on the surface in some sort of habitat, with the emphasis on using a lunar
rover to go further and further from the facility -- still a mission of preliminary exploration rather
than permanence. To further complicate these issues, there is a large body of literature which
discusses the isolation of small groups and the disastrous potential of placing eight people alone in
an extreme environment. Almost inevitably, such groups polarize, jeopardizing not only the
mission but, quite frequently, the lives of mission participants.
With those issues, and the goal of advancing Phase I I level lunar activity as quickly as possible,
the following crew recommendations are made: two career astronauts on the lunar surface (none
on lunar orbit); one astronaut who is also a scientist on the surface; two tech people, construction
workers, or others (e.g., Corps. of Engineers) as part of the landing party.
Age spread is probably one of the most critical crew criteria. There's something utterly depressing
about the idea of a Lunar base without a Pete Conrad, a Storey Musgrave, or someone equally
colorful. But there is a much more important reason for including experienced people in the crew.
It takes only a few interviews with people who have spent extended periods confined in small
quarters with others they might not even like to discover that the reason they were able to survive
was because of the attributes which their age gave them. One survivor of an extended period in
the Arctic recalled a 4-man team with an age spread of 27 to 52 sharing a single tent for months
on end. "Tolerance was a critical issue," he said -- and also pointed out that, as time went on, the
four men "developed more or less the same lifestyle."
Skills diversity may be as important as age. In addition to the obvious skills requirements -- being
able to operate the hardware, run the scientific experiments, and collect exploratory data, the
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crew of a serious Phase II effon must have other abilities. For instance, it is probably not
necessary to take along a physician, but having more than one person on board who is highly
trained as a paramedic and/or emergency medical technician not only seems logical, but
imperative. Construction skills·· the ability read a blueprint, to blast basic shelter Ot!t of the lunar
hardpan and to hook together functioning habitats or facilities from whatever is available at hand
more closely resemble the description of an Englishman dropped off at the Australian penal
colony than the picture of the classic American astronaut. Yet these are precisely the skills that
will be needed in the early stages of Lunar development. Finally. if this crew is truly intended IO
be the forerunners of a permanent human presence, then a mix of genders and cultures must be
introduced as early as possible·· preferably staning with the first mission
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